

















SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
SM: Stuart Mole (Respondant) 
[s.l. = sounds like] 
 
 
SO: This is Sue Onslow talking to Mr Stuart Mole at Exeter University on 1st 
February 2013.  Stuart, thank you very much indeed for agreeing to talk 
to me.  I wonder if you could begin by saying, please, how did you come 
to work at the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1984? 
 
SM: I’d been working for David Steel as the head of his office as Leader of the 
Liberal Party. We’d come through the 1983 election and we’d had great 
hopes of the SDP Liberal Alliance overtaking Labour, and although it polled 
well, it didn’t do well enough. So I was looking for new employment in 1984 
and David Steel was helpful to me in approaching various potential 
employers. One of them was the Commonwealth Secretariat because Sonny 
Ramphal was well known and well admired, and a good friend of David Steel. 
I drafted a letter which David signed which we sent to the Secretariat and that 
was the beginning. I think the first thing that Sonny did was to talk to me and 
then he encouraged me to see the Assistant Secretary-General, Moni 
Malhoutra, who was also head of the SG’s office as well. I had an interview 
with Moni and I remember going along and preparing what I thought was very 
well by finding all I could about the Commonwealth and doing an awful lot of 
research  
 
Moni - an Indian national - was someone who had a fantastic brain, a 
tremendous intellect, but perhaps was not the strongest on empathy and 
progressive management techniques. In the course of this interview he just 
demolished me. By half way through I felt there was no point going any 
further. He had ripped apart any opinion I’d cared to venture, showed me that 
any of the research I’d done was completely wrong and I was therefore 
reduced to silence. I thought, ‘Well, that will be the end of that’. I went away 
and I took all the documents I’d collected about the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and everything else and I threw them in the wastepaper basket 
and went on with life. About two months later, completely out of the blue, 
came a letter on blue note paper appointing me to the position of Assistant 
Director in the Commonwealth Secretariat as Special Assistant to Sonny 
Ramphal. This really conditioned how I thought of Marlborough House and 
the Secretariat from the first few months because for quite a period it seemed 
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as though some terrible administrative error had been made and that I was 
there under wholly false pretences. 
 
SO: [Laughter]. He wanted a different Stuart Mole? 
 
SM: Yes, it must have been or my name had somehow got transposed on to the 
appointment document because the first two or three months I was 
completely at sea and the Secretariat seemed to be wholly alien to me. It was 
only when I talked later on to other people about their experiences coming 
into the Secretariat that I realised they were saying exactly the same thing. 
 
SO: So this was Moni Malhoutra’s interviewing style? 
 
SM: Moni Malhoutra’s interview left me feeling about two inches tall and with the 
profound feeling that he had nothing but the utmost contempt for me and my 
abilities. Therefore I couldn’t conceive that he would possibly want to appoint 
me to anything. But I think that the sense of bewilderment that a lot of people 
had, and possibly still have, in coming into the Secretariat is to do with other 
things as well. It’s not only to do with a rather arcane appointment procedure 
which now may be a lot better, a lot more efficient and a lot more ordered, but 
also to do with being inducted into some fairly strange processes. 
 
SO: What was the arcane appointment procedure when you first arrived? 
 
SM: As far as appointments to the Secretary-General’s office were concerned, as 
this story illustrates, there were no elaborate procedures.  It was simply within 
the fiat of the Secretary-General as to whom he cared to appoint, and you 
would have to describe those appointment procedures as pretty rudimentary. 
I was involved in the recent Director of the Secretary-General’s office, being 
invited to sit as an external member on the appointment panel. I found the 
procedures were a world apart from my experiences then, and much better 
today. They included written work and exercises and so on which seek to test 
some of the key characteristics needed of a private office person. So we’re in 
a different world now. 
 
SO: Had that new world started to emerge by the time you left the Secretary- 
General’s office? 
 
SM: It had painfully begun to emerge, yes. Along the way the Secretariat had been 
subject to periodic external review (and indeed is just emerging from the 
latest bout) but it also has had internal consultants and internal review too. So 
gradually the Secretariat has acquired better procedures but it very much 
depends on the management style of the Secretary-General in terms of what 
they deem to be proper for the organisation that they’re running. Not many 
have had particular skills in that regard. They’re interested in leadership but 
being a good leader is not the same as being a good manager. I think that to 
the extent that successive Secretaries-General have been good managers, it 
is entirely coincidental. Or incidental, perhaps I should say. 
 
SO: So just going back to your arrival back in 1984, this was not a well-oiled 
diplomatic machine then? 
 
SM: No. It obviously had some fairly established procedures which had been 
drawn from the British system and so there was a slight sense of stepping 
back into a kind of different time. The British civil servants were used quite 
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extensively in the first year or two of the Secretariat’s life. They had to help 
deliver, what in ‘65-’66, three Prime Ministers meetings. There was one in 
1965; there was the special meeting in Lagos in ’66 and then there was 
another one in the autumn, in September 1966. 
 
SO: Yes, it was back in London. 
 
SM: So that is something that the fledgling Secretariat couldn’t possibly cope with 
alone. So there was a big British influence at the beginning, even though it 
was an independent Secretariat. I think some of these British practices 
endured. We always used to have treasury tags and some of the procedures 
for making copies of things which seemed to me to be from the British 
system, but probably would have been from a fairly old fashioned British 
system. 
 
SO: From the India Office? 
 
SM: Yes, that sort of stuff. Sonny is a great man and was a great Secretary- 
General, and he basically talent-hunted people. He saw people who could 
make a contribution and he made sure they came to the Secretariat and 
worked for him. So that’s precisely what happened with Sir Peter Marshall, for 
example. Sonny went to Geneva to discuss the campaign for the Common 
Fund. Peter Marshall was enthused to work for Sonny but also Sonny spotted 
him as someone who could be useful to the organisation. Chris Laidlaw, the 
New Zealander - 
 
SO: Your predecessor. 
 
SM: - my predecessor, yes, he was in a diplomatic position in Paris. He came to 
work for Sonny at about half the salary; and it was simply because he was 
head hunted and he wanted to work for such an inspiring figure. It did mean 
that the management procedures were rather few and far between. I got the 
impression that the management arrangements were there to make sure that 
the Secretary-General’s wishes were carried out. So the Finance department 
and the Personnel department would very much take the guidance of the 
Secretary-General and what he wanted. 
 
SO: Was the same true of International Affairs Division and Strategic 
Planning and Evaluation? 
 
SM: Strategic Planning and Evaluation didn’t exist at that point. That came in, 
during Chief Anyaoku’s period as a result of the management review following 
the 1991 High Level Appraisal, I think. So I think that would have been about 
1992 or 1993. International Affairs Division was, I think, very much lead by the 
Secretary-General (and through the private office) setting the agendas. There 
would have been some things that IAD would have been doing, for instance a 
regular monitoring presence at the United Nations, various kind of 
international assignments and contacts that they would have had which they 
would do as a matter of course. But their agenda, I would have said, was very 
much set by the Secretary-General. 
 
SO: Was Moni Malhoutra himself recruited by Sonny Ramphal? 
 
SM: Yes indeed. He was at that point running Mrs Gandhi’s Private Office and 
again I think Sonny spotted someone who could be enormously helpful and 
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duly recruited Moni. Moni was very much Sonny’s enforcer and he had the 
authority and the status to go with it. There were tensions and difficulties 
resentments with the Deputy Secretaries-General from time to time, but 
Sonny’s leadership was the overriding factor. Moni had a brilliant mind and 
was, in lots of ways an excellent advisor for the SG but he treated many of his 
subordinates, including me, in a less than ideal way and some of us still have 
the scars! 
 
None of this may have mattered except for the fact, in Moni’s case, that at the 
very end of Sonny’s term, in ’88 or ’89, the question of the Deputy Secretary-
General (Political) position came up, as a vacancy had arisen. 
 
SO: In 1989 it would have been Chief Anyaoku, as he was being proposed 
for Secretary-General then. 
 
SM: That’s right. This was to fill Anyaoku’s position and I am sure Sonny wanted 
Moni to be elected as the Deputy Secretary-General. Now at this point - and 
this is something that Emeka later changed - Commonwealth governments 
elected the various Deputy Secretaries-General. So the Secretary-General 
was elected by governments at CHOGM but the Deputy Secretaries-General 
were also elected by governments, though at a London inter-governmental 
meeting Emeka changed that because he said, “Look, I need to have the 
authority to appoint my own deputies and all my staff.” This was an interesting 
and valuable development but in the case of Sonny that hadn’t yet happened. 
So Moni was proposed, amongst others, to be the next Deputy Secretary-
General, but was surprisingly beaten by the Australian nominee, Sir Anthony 
Siaguru, from Papua New Guinea. Anthony was an absolutely great guy, but 
was an unlikely candidate in other respects. According to some, this reflected 
some of the negative feedback which may have flowed into High 
Commissions from some of Moni’s subordinates. That was the story, anyway. 
 
SO: So, by the time then that Kris Srinivasan became Deputy Secretary-
General, that was within Chief Anyaoku’s control and remit? 
 
SM: That’s right, yes. The same was true of Deputy Secretary-General, Dame 
Veronica Sutherland. Emeka was keen to appoint a woman to the post. I do 
remember Veronica coming to see Emeka and then returning for a further 
interview. So once again the interview procedures and appointment 
procedures were unusual, I think, but within the ambit of the Secretary-
General’s prerogative. 
 
SO: Stuart, while you were working then at the Commonwealth Secretariat 
how far was this a well-structured, diplomatic machine?  Or was it an 
organisation in which there appeared to be concentric circles of power, 
with varying connections and controlled patterns of information sharing 
- because every organisation has its different forms and norms. 
 
SM: First of all, there was an underlay which had been put in place which reflected 
British systems. Then on top of that was the fact of it being a multinational 
and multicultural organisation. So there is no formal quota system for the 
appointment of staff to the Commonwealth Secretariat but the Secretary- 
General, in his appointments, is supposed to pay due regard to geographical 
balance. That is probably the polite term for making sure that at least all the 
five regions of the Commonwealth, if not every single country, were 
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adequately represented. Of course, that requirement has also got to be 
balanced against the quality of the appointee.  
 
Being a multinational Secretariat meant that a backdrop of there being a lot of 
issues about race and political equality in Commonwealth debates at the time, 
had their reflection within the Secretariat. 
 
So it was particularly important that a member of staff coming into a 
Secretariat appointment from Africa or from Asia, say, should feel a position 
of equality not only in terms and conditions of services and pay, but also as 
regards their status compared with someone from the old Commonwealth, 
whether the UK, Canada or New Zealand, or wherever. This may explain why 
the Secretariat which has never been a large organisation by international 
standards (having reached 400 personnel at its peak) was none-the-less 
surprisingly bureaucratic and cumbersome, and probably is to this day. An 
excessive caution about treating all of the same rank equally did generate, I 
felt, cumbersome but politically correct processes. This meant that, in its 
normal working operations, it moves more slowly than it need to. 
 
On top of that were the methods of appointment. First was Arnold Smith, of 
course, and then there was Sonny. In those early days they were very much 
headhunting on a personal basis. Arnold was ringing up a Prime Minister and 
saying “Look, I need a good Head of International Affairs. Who can you give 
me?” Sonny was no different in that respect, but I think also every Secretary- 
General - and it was certainly true of Sonny - would want to see a good 
reflection of their region within the Secretariat. So there was a sense that from 
the Caribbean and from Guyana in particular - there would be some trusted 
people close to Sonny. In all fairness to the SG, if he’d left the Secretariat just 
to chug along as a machine, it would be a fairly slow moving and 
dysfunctional machine. This may be a bit of a clue to later times when the 
Secretaries-General may have tried to ignore the Secretariat - or not exactly 
ignore it, but not to lead it. Sonny’s nature was to lead the organisation and to 
galvanise it into the purposes which he very clearly saw. 
 
So in doing this, he would have a team around him whom he would most rely 
upon for advice and for implementing action.  There might be others whose 
work was seen to be less immediate; it would be several circles further out. 
So I think there was a lot of personal chemistry involved that was important to 
Sonny. 
 
SO: What about Chief Emeka? What was your position once the SG position 
changed? The Chief was selected in 1989, elected by the Heads of 
Government at Kuala Lumpur, and came into the office then in 1990. Did 
that affect your position in any way? 
 
SM: Emeka had asked me to stay on and become the head of his office. So from 
that point of view it was a fairly seamless transition - to say farewell to Sonny 
and to be involved in Sonny’s departure; and then to welcome Emeka in and 
to have everything ready when he came. Now I also had experience of doing 
that when Emeka departed in 1999 and, again, did a lot of work with his fair-
welling and with Don McKinnon’s arrival. Then I stayed on a few months to 
see in Don McKinnon. I maybe could have stayed on for a year or so longer, 
but felt it was time to go. The difference between McKinnon’s entry as 
Secretary-General and Chief Emeka’s was that the Chief consciously took 




SO: Did you stay in touch with him? 
 
SM: He didn’t stay in touch with me, certainly. He may have stayed in touch with 
other people but I think he generally shut himself away. That was very 
interesting and understandable because he came into the Secretariat in 
December 1965.   He’d been ‘man and boy’ in the Secretariat, beginning in 
the International Affairs Division as an Assistant Director, working his way up 
the organisation and had been there almost continuously all that time. So 
there wasn’t much you could have told him about the organisation; he needed 
no induction in that respect. He knew the personalities, he knew 
governments. Again I don’t think there was too much politically that he 
needed to be in touch with the Secretariat about. He took himself away and 
developed this ‘mantra’ – his mission statement, if you like. I wouldn’t 
describe Emeka as a ‘visionary’ in that sense but he manufactured a very 
clear mission for himself and for the Commonwealth. He felt quite keenly the 
criticisms from outside of some of those Commonwealth Governments who 
had been pursuing the anti-apartheid cause but whose regimes were very far 
from being democratic. 
 
There were, at the time of Emeka’s first Heads of Government meeting, 
around 9 or 10 (depending on how you define them), military or one-party 
states in the membership. In the Commonwealth in 1991, there were 49 
countries in the Commonwealth at that point. But it did mean that 20% of 
Commonwealth countries at that stage were by no stretch of the imagination 
democratic. Obviously as the anti-apartheid struggle had got nastier, and in 
particular coming from the British tabloids, there had been a lot of stuff 
directed at African leaders, some of it thinly disguised racism. There had been 
plenty of justification of some of the criticism, one ought to add. It had 
certainly hit home with Emeka. Emeka was a great anglophile anyway, and 
was more conscious of this criticism than others. Anyway, it strengthened his 
belief that the Secretariat needed to put its own house in order. 
 
SO: How much was that Emeka’s own decision or was it building upon the 
High-Level Appraisal Group coming out of Kuala Lumpur which had 
initiated a phase of examination of the Commonwealth and its 
direction? 
 
SM: He had decided early on that this was a real problem that needed to be 
addressed.  So obviously there was a sense in which the high level appraisal 
contributed to his leadership on that issue. I would give Emeka a huge 
amount of credit for having gone away, on his ‘retreat’, and decided that the 
Commonwealth had to develop its democratic and human rights agenda. Now 
I’m not saying that Emeka, either then, or as it’s turned out later, is a populist 
democrat or human rights advocate, because he’s a rather patrician figure. I 
don’t think his instincts are always naturally in that area but he decided as a 
matter of principle that this is what should be done. And that’s where the 
Commonwealth went. As I say, he had this mantra in his head about what the 
Commonwealth needed to do and he kept repeating it over the next 10 years; 
and he did decide in 1988-89 that the Commonwealth needed the High-Level 
Appraisal Group. Again, here’s a good contrast between Don McKinnon 
because one thing Emeka did do was that he got immediately stuck in to all 
the meetings of the Working Group of Experienced Officials. This was a group 
of ‘sherpas’ doing all the legwork for the High Level Appraisal Group, under 
the chairmanship of a prominent Malaysian official. Emeka was there and 
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took a leading part in all these discussions so that there would be no 
surprises later on. The working group of experienced officials included Lord 
Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary. He’s worthwhile talking to as well. 
 
SO: He’s interviewing me before he’ll agree. 
 
SM: Is he? Oh, okay! [Laughter]. The Working Group produced the report that 
went before Commonwealth leaders in Harare in 1991. In Harare, the High- 
Level Appraisal Group under Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mohamad 
Mahathir actually only met for part of the day. So actually the High-Level 
Appraisal Group composed of Heads of Government didn’t do much work 
apart from a slightly skewed examination of future directions. They 
considered the membership issue; they talked about election observer 
missions, and so on.  But it was really at the Retreat in Elephant Hills where 
this debate was brought into some kind of coherence as the “Commonwealth 
Harare Declaration”. Again, I know that Lord Armstrong, for the British 
Government had another draft of the Harare Declaration ready. 
 
There is an interesting contrast with Don McKinnon’s arrival as Secretary-
General. He was in touch with the office in the build up to his arrival. He saw 
Emeka several times – they had a series of meetings in London. I remember 
one in New York as well.  
 
Don seemed to be pretty clear in his own mind about what he intended to do. 
I am not sure what Emeka said made much difference, but then that’s 
probably always the way with successors and their predecessors. 
 
Don McKinnon had a thoroughly hands-off approach to his own high level 
review because he too had a review process coming of the same Durban 
summit (in 1999) that elected him SG. Instead of getting stuck in immediately, 
making sure as Emeka did, that it was precisely as he wanted, governments 
were allowed to move in, which I thought was a mistake. So, from the very 
beginning, I felt he lost some ground on that. He was able, of course, to join 
these discussions simply at Heads of Government level, but by then he was 
probably a bit behind the game. So there was a big difference between the 
two in style. 
 
In terms of Emeka, he’s very conscious of his status; he is a Chief and there 
are certain ways that chiefs should behave. To his critics, this could 
sometimes be vaguely ridiculously, and perhaps a bit pompous.   
 
SO: Was it just being conscious of his dignity? 
 
SM: He would say – and I give him credit for this argument – that he was 
protecting not his personal dignity, but of the dignity of his office. I remember 
occasions when he managed to rescue certain events from total farce by 
investing them with his own personal dignity. On one occasion we had a 
dawn wreath laying ceremony in New Zealand on ANZAC Day, and 
something terrible had happened just before he was due to lay his wreath: 
somebody had fallen over and the wreaths had been knocked over. It was 
just a moment of farce when the whole thing could have dissolved into 
laughter and ridicule. Chief pulled it all back into a proper solemn occasion by 
walking with this huge dignity, holding his own wreath, by taking all the time in 
the world with his bow and with his personal respects, before turning and 
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marching in a very measured way back to his place. He just brought the 
whole ceremony back into some sort of order and proper respect. 
 
There were other occasions when he would insist on doing something that I 
thought was a bit petty and pompous, but he would say “I’m not doing this for 
me; I’m doing it for the dignity of the office.” He was very conscious that if he 
got fobbed off with a Permanent Secretary as opposed to meeting a senior 
Minister or Head of Government, that was the beginning of a dangerously 
slippery slope. 
 
That’s what officials wanted: to be in control of their Secretary-General, to be 
able to take over. It was a way of taking upon themselves, of diverting that 
channel of power and of reinterpreting the message for their heads of 
government. Emeka knew (as did other SGs) that the personal relationship 
with heads of government was an absolutely essential part of the chemistry. 
 
SO: It’s validation also of the role of the Secretary-General. 
 
SM: Yes it is, it’s the be-all and end-all. Consultation is “the lifeblood of the 
Commonwealth”, as the Memorandum of Understanding says, and the 
Secretary-General has to be the embodiment of that. He has to be the nerve 
centre of that consultation and consultation in the broadest sense. He has to 
be able to pick up on silences as well as sounds and to be aware, as far as 
he can, of all opinions. There are ultimately limitations on that approach and 
one of them is electing people to offices. The Commonwealth has a rather 
strange way of dealing with elections. Other than that, it would be for the 
Secretary-General to appreciate that there was a difficulty in the Pacific, even 
though Pacific leaders, probably for reasons of politeness, wouldn’t be 
articulating the fact that they had a problem but it would be apparent in other 
ways. Emeka was very good at picking up on those signals. 
 
SO: How about the workings of the Secretariat during his tenure as 
Secretary-General? 
 
SM: One of the things that Emeka had very clear in his mind - and this was part of 
what was Emeka’s mission – was that there would need to be not only this 
high-level reappraisal of the future directions of the Commonwealth, now the 
battles of apartheid were increasingly in the past, but also the Secretariat 
would need to be re-vamped. So he always knew that he wanted to bring in 
management consultants and that he wanted there to be a whole chain of 
internal changes within the Secretariat. I think that was a necessary process 
which moved us further down the road, in what were changed circumstances. 
Sonny had experienced the Secretariat at its very peak and he had been 
used to adding people and adding divisions, more or less at will. 
 
SO: How did he have the budget for that? 
 
SM: Well, the budget came with it. So funds were established on the way, and he 
was able to find funding for new activities. Also countries of course were 
joining, and there was not at that stage a zero growth budget. Emeka, facing 
tightening budgets, realised that he had to reduce staff, streamline divisions; 
and staff numbers started coming down from their peak. There were two 
Assistant Secretaries-General – one was the Head of the Secretary-General’s 
office. The other Assistant Secretary-General was also the Managing Director 
of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and that tended to be 
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a Canadian because the Canadians were amongst the biggest contributors to 
the Fund. Emeka, with the management review, reverted to having three 
Deputy Secretaries-General. 
 
So three Deputy Secretaries-Generals, no Assistant SGs, a reduction in the 
number of divisions, rationalising programmes. So Emeka did embark on 
rigorous change there. He looked at the Terms and Conditions of all the staff. 
One of the great issues in the Secretariat has been the whole question of 
contract tenure and rotation of staff. There has been a differential between 
locally recruited staff and overseas recruited staff and this has also had an 
impact on rotation policy. The argument has been that better terms should be 
given to the overseas staff because they will be serving a term or two and 
then they’ll be going home and so on. There was a lot of debate, which goes 
on still, about how many terms should someone expect with their 
appointment? Is it one contract of three years, two contracts of six or three 
contracts of nine? This argument has gone on and on. In Emeka’s time the 
rule was “one term if you’re no good; two terms of you’re any good; and three 
terms if you’re really good”. 
 
SO: Stuart, did you count as locally engaged? 
 
SM: I was included at in the diplomatic level, but I was locally recruited so I did not 
have any of the diplomatic privileges which other overseas recruited 
diplomatic staff had. Interestingly enough, I discovered by looking through the 
1965 record of the Prime Minister’s meeting, that the reason why the 
Secretariat was given some privileges but not immunity from parking 
regulations was because when Harold Wilson (who was in the chair) said 
“Well, actually we’ve had a terrible problem with it.” 
 
SO: ‘We’ still do! 
 
SM: We still do. “Do you mind if we leave that one out?” said Harold. So that’s why 
the Secretariat staff can’t park on double yellow lines! But overseas 
diplomatic staff do get duty-free alcohol, immunity from prosecution and 
taxation, and other privileges. So there was a differential there. The three 
contract rule applied for a particular appointment, so if you were an Assistant 
Director, the rule applied to that grade. If you were then promoted, the clock 
was re-set. So it meant that by the time I became a Director (after a year with 
Emeka as Head of his office) in 1991 my clock for nine years as a Director 
would have started ticking at that point. Even so, even after that the 
Secretary-General has discretion to give people a year or two extension, if 
need be. This issue has raged on and on ever since and it’s been the cause 
of serious litigation.  One of the things that happened while I was there was 
that because the Secretariat didn’t want to be subject to English employment 
law, it had to agree to alternative arbitration machinery to justify it being; so as 
an international organisation, it had to have an arbitral tribunal for the external 
and independent redress of staff grievances. There was scarcely a case 
referred to the Arbitral Tribunal under Anyaoku – it had not long been 
established – but McKinnon had to deal with a rising number of cases. One or 
two have proved expensive for the Secretariat in terms of compensation. 
However, that was the kind of price that had to be paid for being an 
independent international organisation.  
 
SO: So this fundamental restructuring of the Commonwealth Secretariat was 
a painful process of managing change. Did that diminish the efficacy of 
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the Secretariat in the 90s? After all, the Commonwealth itself was going 
through a process of change. So there would be new challenges placed 
upon the administrative staff. 
 
SM: I happen to be of the view that leadership is the crucial ingredient here. It is 
how the Secretariat is led and what the kind of culture that leadership instils 
and what it means in terms of setting standards for others. I think that Sonny 
was probably, above all the Secretaries-General, the one who managed to 
inspire much of the organisation, whatever they were doing; even those 
remote from him, in some of those outer circles. He inspired them to give 
what they could in their respective fields, even if he may not have taken a 
very close interest in what they were doing. He also had a personal touch. For 
instance, every Christmas there was a staff Christmas party and Sonny would 
himself cook the most wonderful Caribbean food for staff. That kind of touch 
has an impact. I could never have imagined Emeka doing that. He was 
naturally more remote - utterly polite and utterly charming, but not with that 
kind of common touch. Don McKinnon was probably the most relaxed and 
matey with staff, but this could sometimes be a disadvantage, particularly in 
his handling of personnel decisions. 
 
What I would say in defence of the Secretaries-General is it was a huge 
challenge for Arnold Smith in setting up this body; none of his successors had 
that task to actually create something out of nothing. To create something 
where the expectations of some of the most powerful governments were so 
minimal and where actually it was something that Arnold Smith had to create 
out of flesh and bone, as much as anything else. So others didn’t have that 
challenge, but others had to cope with changes in the international climate. 
They couldn’t make do with the pioneer spirit, the kind of make-and-do 
approach; they had to be conscious of international norms, increasingly 
conscious. I think even now we’re only truly connecting with some of the 
international standards in terms of behaviour and management, accounting 
procedures, and all the rest of it. 
 
I would suspect that the pioneering spirit of the early days extended as far as 
the finances; that’s as far as I would say. Certainly Patsy Robertson was told 
when she was appointed by Arnold Smith, “I’ll find something out of petty 
cash to pay you.” Which I think she found rather insulting! So, times have 
changed a lot and the SG has a lot more to put up with in terms of managing 
this still cumbersome, multicultural organisation. But my view hasn’t changed 
that the root of a successful Secretariat is leadership and a Secretary-General 
ought to be able to capture that organisation and lead it successfully; no 
amount of international norms and kite marks, or whatever, will be enough. 
The organisation may be in conformity with every possible international 
standard but unless you’ve got somebody driving the organisation, it’s not 
going to go anywhere. 
 
SO: Part 3. Stuart, I wonder if you could elaborate please on how each of the 
Secretaries-General handled the British Government? 
 
SM: My experience is of Sonny Ramphal, of Emeka Anyaoku and a bit of Don 
McKinnon and I know that Don’s memoirs are just out. 
 
 Beginning with Sonny: his relations with Mrs Thatcher were on the whole 
difficult, I would say. Although there was a sort of undercurrent - other people 
have mentioned this aspect of Mrs Thatcher’s femininity – of mild chemistry 
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there. She probably thought he was a bit of a rascal but I think nonetheless 
she found him an engaging rascal at that. After all, at the very end, she 
invited him to dinner at Downing Street and described him as ‘a superb 
Secretary-General’. So, in a sense although they were coming from 
completely different planets - or completely different parts of the planet, there 
was some mutual respect. Certainly, towards the end of Sonny’s time, the 
relations with the British Government got very bad indeed and part of Sir 
Peter Marshall’s job as Deputy Secretary-General was to keep in touch with 
the Permanent Under-Secretary in the FCO and to just try and keep things as 
much on the road as he possible could. 
 
SO: So that was an increasingly tough job? 
 
SM: That was an increasingly tough job and one that Peter Marshall did for much 
of his tenure. Peter came in, in 1983 and served until 1989; so for all that time 
I think for Peter life was pretty difficult. 
 
SO: Mrs Thatcher was not the entirety of the British Government, but she 
dominated policy to an increasing degree. 
 
SM: She dominated policy and she infected the civil service as well. I thought 
there was a big difference between how the officials in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and indeed in other parts of the system behaved in 
relation to the Commonwealth during that time, compared with, say, the 
present. I remember as a Brit sitting and listening to UK ministers and to 
senior officials talking and thinking “Why can’t you be positive? It would be so 
easy to say things that would win you friends and which would create 
understanding but instead you’re speaking in this barren and arrogant 
language and it’s getting you absolutely nowhere.” Some of the officials, the 
only thing they could think of, and talk about, was money. They had no 
broader perspective, no broader feel for the Commonwealth or where they 
could be helpful. I could think of one or two names of that period who were 
exemplars of that kind of approach and it was so damaging, but I think it was, 
at root, Her Master’s Voice that was coming through. 
 
SO: How about the political appointments? You talk about the civil servants 
within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Treasury? 
 
SM: There were actually some very interesting figures there, weren’t there? Lord 
Carrington: I think had a fairly healthy dislike of Sonny Ramphal from their 
exchanges over Zimbabwe, but Carrington had a fairly interesting and 
enlightened FCO team didn’t he? 
 
SO: Yes, very much so. 
 
SM: He had Iain Gilmour, Douglas Hurd. 
 
SO: As well as Richard Luce. 
 
SM: Richard Luce. There were some really excellent people there. For instance, 
on the Middle East I think there was movement there, wasn’t there? Maybe 
this is all another story. 
 




SM: Geoffrey Howe was a case in point of someone who actually at times rescued 
Mrs Thatcher from her worst excesses. He certainly did that at the time of the 
Special Summit on the Eminent Persons Group Report in August 1986. The 
odd thing about Mrs Thatcher was that when stripped of her briefings and her 
official persona and whatever, she reverted back into pure Grantham: all 
these original homespun attitudes would come bubbling out and at times it 
was quite horrifying. It wasn’t the official position of the British Government 
but it was being articulated by the Prime Minister and I think that was quite 
shocking for people. I do remember something of that kind happening on the 
morning of the discussion of the seven heads in 1986. It was only Geoffrey 
Howe coming in, in the afternoon, who managed to pull things back from what 
might have been a disastrous result. Then of course there was the occasion 
when John Major was famously rebuffed by Mrs Thatcher on South Africa 
when he had painstakingly, with other Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, 
negotiated an agreement in Kuala Lumpur in 1989. 
 
SO: When John Major became Prime Minister, though, was there an easing 
of tensions between Marlborough House and Downing Street? Or is 
there an inevitable tension between the two? 
 
SM: It was an easier relationship, no question of that. Sonny, I think, is very fond 
of the UK but I wouldn’t describe him as an Anglophile in the way that Emeka 
is. Emeka, I think, has taken it one step on, almost to the point, on occasions, 
of being rather more trusting of the British than I think they deserved. So his 
relations with John Major were very good. On a particular issue they fell out, 
certainly I remember that. Indeed one very embarrassing occasion occurred 
at the 1993 Limassol CHOGM meeting in Cyprus. This was again a fall-out of 
from the High Level Appraisal. Heads looked at the term of the Secretary-
General and at Emeka’s second term. He was elected in 1989 and took office 
in 1990. So he had an expectation of at least two five year terms (though I 
think he wouldn’t have wanted more than that). The proposal was that they 
should move the SG to two four year terms as a maximum. In the course of 
the debate, there was a disagreement about timing and dates and it came out 
badly. First of all, it looked as though the British had no confidence in Emeka 
having a second term. 
 
Secondly, it looked as though they were trying to shave off his time by 
effectively cutting away at his term. Emeka absolutely stood his ground. The 
great thing about Emeka, as indeed with Sonny, was that when he got to a 
certain line he would stand behind it, and that was that. He knew precisely 
when to do that and to hell with the consequences. Emeka effectively won 
that particular contest, though there were some formal words that got them 
round the corner. 
 
I remember John Major because Commonwealth membership was discussed 
in Harare, in the context of the Harare Declaration. So it was rather 
interesting; there was established the principle that for a country to join they 
had to sign up to this “charter” of democracy and human rights, and they also 
had to show that they were living by these principles, and not just paying lip-
service. 
 
So that was an interesting development in terms of membership. It was a 
precursor of what later happened in terms of “Well, now you’re a member, 
what standard do we expect you to live up to?” I think the other disagreement 
with John Major, was at the ’95 summit where he was hoping that Heads 
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could get a rather more restrictive framework on membership in place, to 
avoid a “Mozambique factor” coming through and that you wouldn’t get the 
kind of Mozambique factor coming through. 
 
SO: What do you mean ‘the Mozambique factor’? 
 
SM: Well, by then Cameroon had flagged up that it wanted to join the 
Commonwealth and I think Mozambique by then had made clear it also 
wanted to join. John Major wasn’t in favour of this and hoped that the working 
group on membership criteria could be established. This happened and the 
group was led by the then New Zealand High Commissioner in London, John 
Collinge. John Major’s ploy was for Heads to agree to the working group 
looking at membership criteria which would postpone a decision on 
Mozambique and then recommend a restrictive approach, leading to quite 
tight entry requirements which would bat away Cameroon and Mozambique. 
But of course Nelson Mandela drove a coach and horses through this by 
proposing Mozambique’s membership at the Retreat of the 1995 Auckland 
CHOGM. Of course this was received with acclamation and completely blew 
away John Major’s attempts to hold the line. When we got to Edinburgh, two 
years later, there were then three applications on the table from Palestine, 
Rwanda and Yemen. By then Tony Blair, with some difficulty, was able to kick 
all of these into touch. Even so, a substantial proportion of Heads still wanted 
Palestine, a non-state though it was, to be a member. 
 
SO: Had that been emerging through the ‘90s from the Oslo Accords? 
 
SM: It had. One of the interesting things about the Commonwealth is the way that 
some major international issues, such as the Middle East, seeped into 
Commonwealth discussions even though there was no, at present, Middle 
East countries within the Commonwealth. Emeka, being Emeka, did have 
some discussions about trying to engineer a situation where Palestine would 
be accepted into membership, alongside Israel and Jordan. 
 
SO: That would have been interesting. 
 
SM: [Laughter]. Yes, as a kind of tripartite solution. He certainly had some 
discussions with the Israeli Ambassador in London in that regard. 
 
 As regards the Palestinian application, Yasser Arafat delivered this personally 
to the SG at Marlborough House. I remember the day Yasser Arafat came 
and he was wearing his traditional outfit and Chief was dressed up in his 
Nigerian robes. At the end of the discussion upstairs in the Secretary- 
General’s office, Chief offered to show him Marlborough House and the state 
rooms and said “Stuart will you guide?” So I took them round the fine rooms 
and they stopped under this portrait of the Queen and they both looked and I 
though “If only I had a camera.” Because the sight of Yasser Arafat and 
Emeka, standing either side of the portrait in their robes, admiring this picture 
of the Queen, would have been a fantastic picture, I thought. Anyway, though 
nothing happened in 1997, Rwanda persisted and eventually came into 
membership 10 years later. 
 
SO: Was Arafat serious about this, do you think? 
 
SM: I think he was a lot more serious, for instance, than Fidel Castro was when he 






SM: I think at that point Arafat was looking for any degree of support and 
validation he could find. Also I think they probably had overblown 
expectations of what the Commonwealth could provide in material terms.  
 
SO: How about with Blair? 
 
SM: It was very interesting to see the British organising the 1997 CHOGM 
because all along there was a kind of presumption of British superiority. You 
know, the expectation in the Commonwealth that whatever the British did 
would be the ultimate in organisation and everything. This pervaded the 
British sense of their own self-importance in that respect and in some 
respects Edinburgh was a cock-up on several levels. The conference centre 
was too small; the Edinburgh International Conference Centre was actually 
not quite big enough for a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. 
For The Retreat, the idea of just a train ride up to St Andrews and back wasn’t 
a good idea, I think. The Opening Ceremony was a complete disaster. It was 
affected by this kind of “Cool Britannia” approach that characterised the early 
Tony Blair administration. What the Commonwealth does want, in any country 
they go to, is authentic home-grown culture, or not necessarily so much 
authentic. You know, they want the business: when they come to Britain, they 
want Beefeaters and Life Guards and, if they’re going to Scotland, bagpipes 
and kilts; and the National Anthem and the Queen and everything else. What 
they got was Tony Blair banning bagpipes and kilts: no obvious Scottishness, 
no Life Guards, and we had a version of the National Anthem which sounded 
as if it was being played on the central heating system. 
 
SO: ‘God Save the Queen’ in hip-hop style? 
 
SM: Yes, and it was such a wrong call. Tony Blair’s approach to the 
Commonwealth also was quite misguided. He saw them as a genial backdrop 
to his photo opportunity. So one of the struggles we had was at the Retreat. 
Retreat discussions, as each Heads of Government meetings went on, were 
getting more formalised. Less and less of the formal business was done in the 
Executive Session, more and more of it was being pushed into the Retreat. In 
the very early days at Sonny’s first Retreat (in Gleneagles in 1977) he got a 
few heads together. The rest generally played golf and exercised and walked.  
As David Lange, the New Zealand Prime Minister said of the outsiders, “We 
had our noses pressed to the window.” The rest of them were excluded, apart 
from those that had to do the deals. By this time, it had become formalised to 
the extent that you had a room where all the Heads could come and they 
would all sit round in a position of equality, and it got more difficult, the bigger 
the Commonwealth got. 
 
To keep it informal, you’d try and avoid having tables and blotters and all the 
paraphernalia; and, amongst those informal chairs, would be the host Prime 
Minister or President and the Secretary-General. Increasingly you’d have one 
or two staff people at the back and then three or four people at the back and 
then there were five or six people at the back. When we arrived in St Andrews 
I went and saw the meeting room with Alistair Campbell and all the normal 
team there, with Anji Hunter, I think. They had got a kind of little raised 
podium for Tony Blair to sit on, with the Secretary-General next to him and a 
nice flower arrangement. Then the Heads were all theatre style, just sort of 
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sitting row upon row, looking adoringly, and we said “You can’t do it this way.”  
They said “No, no this is all agreed.  Tony’s agreed it, we can’t change it 
now.” We said “Well, you’ll have to.” They said “No, they’re on their way. It’s 
too late.” So we said “Well, I’m sorry, this doesn’t work.” 
 
So we had stalemate. As soon as Emeka arrived, I took him to see the room 
and he immediately went to Tony and it was all changed back to the normal 
arrangement. But that was the sort of thinking there was. Blair didn’t have the 
patience for the Commonwealth. He wanted to cut to the chase and, with the 
Commonwealth obviously, you’ve got to go at the pace of the slowest vessel. 
It takes time before everything is corralled into consensus; you’ve got to give 
it time. 
 
SO: Did Robin Cook ‘get’ the Commonwealth? 
 
SM: Not really. I remember Robin Cook as being a rather indifferent attender 
because what had happened by then, by 1995, was that the Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) had been founded and so Cook had a 
position on CMAG representing the UK. CMAG was actually in those days 
doing some quite important stuff, particularly about Nigeria. But invariably the 
British would send deputies to Cook. There was Derek Fatchett who was 
Junior Foreign Office Minister. He actually died suddenly and it was rather 
tragic because he was a very fit guy. I remember him getting a very high 
score in the Commonwealth versus the Foreign Office cricket match. Then, 
later, there was the Junior Foreign Office Minister and Manchester MP Tony 
Lloyd. I’m afraid that we didn’t see much of Robin Cook. 
 
SO: In terms of British preoccupations and demands on the Foreign 
Secretary at the time, this was the build up to the Kosovo Campaign in 
’98-’99. I’m just thinking of explanations why he might not have been a 
good Commonwealth man. 
 
SM: I think that’s absolutely true, but if you compare the time that people gave, 
what I will say, in defence of Tony Blair, was that he almost without exception 
attended the Commonwealth Day Observance in Westminster Abbey. Others, 
who were ostensibly much more committed to the Commonwealth, had not 
done so. Tony Blair was extremely good about that, I don’t know why but he 
was. 
 
SO: A good photo opportunity? 
 
SM: Possibly, but he invariably didn’t get it, particularly. 
 
SO: Just to conclude, please could you comment, in your experience, on 
each Secretary-General’s relationship with the Palace. 
 
SM: It is a very interesting relationship because it is a distinct one from 
government. I think the Queen sees her relationship as Head of the 
Commonwealth as being quite separate to her relationship with the British 
Prime Minister or the Prime Ministers of her other realms. So Sonny and 
Emeka had regular audiences with the Queen, and I know this was also the 
case with the other three holders of the office. They also saw her on many 
other occasions too. She would come to the big events and there was quite a 
lot of contact. Emeka would keep in close touch with the Private Secretary 
and had quite a number of meetings or lunches or whatever. There were 
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some moments, like over Fiji in 1987, when the Palace actually performed in 
relation to the Governor General, a remarkably separate function to the British 
government machinery. I suppose that was also true of Sir Humphrey Gibbs 
in Rhodesia after UDI; you know that they were operating on a rather different 
track. Again, those links with the Palace and constitutionality were quite 
unique. 
 
SO: As you say, Ratu Penaia’s relationship as Governor was with the Queen. 
 
SM: In Fiji, absolutely, until it became utterly untenable. That was a recognition 
that there was something distinctive there and something that had its own 
particular hold - it may not have been a major element in the crisis but it had 
its own particular hold. Interestingly, when Rabuka came back to power 
legitimately as Prime Minister, the first thing he did was to present the Queen 
with this sign of atonement. 
 
SO: Did he give her a ‘sevu sevu’, the whale’s tooth? 
 
SM: The whale’s tooth, indeed. There were Palace drafts that would go through a 
Commonwealth system but not through the British one, necessarily. Of 
course the Palace would have a British government official; an FCO person 
probably, as an Assistant Private Secretary so there was that connection but I 
can remember drafts of Queen’s speeches and of course the Queen’s 
Commonwealth Day Message would be passed through Commonwealth 
channels for the input of the Secretary-General. So I think the Queen had a 
very clear view - this was a proper job. She wasn’t simply a symbol and the 
relationship was important. The Palace, on the whole being was as helpful as 
it could be. 
 
It’s also interesting to reflect how the succession to the Headship would be 
dealt with in terms of the Commonwealth, and that’s been a tricky issue. 
Obviously one clear possibility is that Prince Charles will be appointed the 
next Head, so there has been continuing attempts, over the years, to develop 
the Prince of Wales’ interest in the Commonwealth. When the Commonwealth 
of Learning was established in Vancouver, the thought was that Prince 
Charles might become the Chairman of the Board of Governors, though that 
in the end came to nothing. It was a pity because Prince Edward had been 
President of the Commonwealth Games Federation and this is a valuable 
role. One thing Emeka did was to open up a role for the Queen at the opening 
ceremony of CHOGM. Up to that point, the Queen never came to the 
CHOGM though everyone thought she did. She would be staying elsewhere 
and would have her audiences there, so Heads would be discreetly leaving 
the meeting to go and have 20 minutes, or whatever, with the Queen and 
come back again. 
 
So she had very good contact with Heads of Government but the only contact 
she had with the meeting itself was a day or so before when the Secretary-
General would take her around the CHOGM venue and show her the meeting 
rooms and introduce the staff, and so on. Then she would go back and she’d 
give a party or two but not actually attend any part of the meeting. Emeka 
broke new ground. Emeka is a huge traditionalist and a great believer in the 
monarchy and he not only brought her into the Opening Ceremony (for the 
1997 CHOGM in Edinburgh) but made sure she gave a speech as well. 
Invariably, she now makes the best speech of all, and has been doing it ever 
since. What was interesting in Uganda in 2007 was that Prince Charles came 
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to the CHOGM and actually joined one of the roundtable discussions that the 
Civil Society organisations were having with Foreign Ministers. That was a 
very interesting and rather doubtful interposition of the son of the Head of the 
Commonwealth in official Commonwealth consultations. There was no kind of 
constitutional justification for that, in my view, but in the way the 
Commonwealth does, it’s slowly edging its way through to somewhere else. 
 
SO: Yes, as Derek Ingram said, it’s the Commonwealth’s ability to constantly 
reinvent itself. 
 
SM: That’s true [laughter]. 
 
SO: Stuart, thank you very, very much indeed. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
